

**Gender, Wage Surveys and 'Self Reconstruction'
in the Swedish Labour Market
- A Research Note**

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Introduction

In Sweden as well as in other countries women are lower paid in the labour market than men. This pattern is well-known. The pay differentials has been relatively stable since the early 1980s, despite a total political unity that gender equality is the most important goal of the equality policies. Official data from Statistics Sweden shows that the average, non-weighted, differential between men and women's wages is 17 per cent, while the weighted figures show that women's wages, in 2002, were 92 per cent of men's (Statistics Sweden, 2004).¹

Women in Sweden make up almost one half of the labour force but they are employed on different terms than men; men generally work in better paid sectors of the economy. 51 per cent of the female workforce are employed in the public sector and 49 per cent in the private sector compared with 19 per cent of the male work force in public sector and 81 per cent in private sector. 14 per cent of all employed women and 13 per cent of all employed men work in occupations with equal sex distribution. Since the labour market is gendered both horizontally and vertically, we find a problem here, with both statistical and practical consequences. Official Swedish statistics register remuneration for 'the same work', not for 'equal work', i.e. 'work of equal value'. The concept 'work of equal value' is of great importance on a gendered labour market, though nobody currently knows the extent of so-called value discrimination. It is difficult to calculate and to statistically prove the existence of value discrimination; at an aggregated, statistical level it is maybe

impossible. At firm level, however, all Swedish employers ever since 2001 have to explain what they mean with work of 'equal value' vs. 'different value'. Every firm must make annual wage surveys, in which it is possible to discover, remedy and prevent unwarranted wage differentials and other unfair employment terms between men and women. This new system for wage mapping, called 'self reconstruction', shall be undertaken in co-operation with the local trade union or other representatives for the employees, and, as an outcome of the surveys, the employers are obliged to prepare an action plan for equal pay between the sexes.

This paper discusses the practical implications and difficulties of the new system, but also how the surveys can be used for research about the present state of gendered work division in Sweden. First, however, the next section gives a brief overview of the legislative framework within which the new rules are developed.

Legislation

In Sweden the realisation of equality between men and women focuses on wages, working conditions, discrimination, sexual harassment, parenthood and so on. The Act on Equality between Men and Women and Work entered into force in 1980 and was superseded by the Equal Opportunities Act in 1992. In 2001, new clauses were inaugurated into the Equal Opportunities Act. The background to these new clauses was that the wage-gap between women and men had not narrowed in the 1980s and 1990s; in some areas it was even widening. Several disputes concerning wage discrimination were tried by the Swedish Labour Court in the 1990s, but in neither

¹ Weighted figures take into account differences in age, educational background, full time/part-time, sector and

case with any success for the plaintiff. The most important and also the most publicised one was the so-called Midwife case (AD 1996 no. 41). A midwife at a hospital in mid-Sweden claimed that her job was of equal value as the job of two male medical technician with a considerably higher salary; thus, she argued, she was discriminated due to her sex. However, the Labour Court's verdict was that it was not proven that the midwife's work tasks were comparable to the medical technician and accordingly it was not proven that she was discriminated. A majority of the Court's members made very high demands for evidence that the two jobs were actually equal. Furthermore, in 2001 the same midwife's - together with another midwife's - work tasks were once again compared to those of a medical technician. This time, the Court found the tasks of equal value, but left it to the employer to justify the pay differences between the employees. To prove that the differences in salary were not discriminating, the employer made three main arguments: first, the employer claimed, the clinical engineer had higher market value; second, the two employees' salaries were regulated by two different collective agreements; and third, the man was older. Accordingly, the pay differential was not discriminating (AD 2001 no. 13).

Kommentar [LL1]: Something missing, difference wages ...check

The Swedish labour court has taken a passive role in the wage formation process in line with the self regulating system. It seems that litigation tactically is not the right instrument to achieve the goal equal wages.

The Equal Opportunities Act consists of two main parts: rules prohibiting the employer from direct and indirect discrimination against a person due to gender, and rules requiring an employer to take active steps to promote equality at the

occupational group.

workplace. Reinforcing amendments were made in both parts of the act in 2001. The most important one, at least from our perspective, is the obligation for all Swedish private and public employers with ten or more employees – in total 35,000 employers – to yearly map differences between men and women’s wages and working conditions and analyse if differences found are justifiable or not, so called wage surveys. The survey and analysis should be set up in an action plan for equal pay.² Within the EC legislation, it is possible for an EU member state to complement the prohibition on discrimination with various forms of active measures (see EC treaty article 141.4). In an international perspective, the Swedish forced regulation of active measures for equal wages and working conditions is unique.

Gender discrimination is not just differences between men and women with ‘equal work tasks’ according to the law; gender discrimination also includes wage differences between men and women with ‘work of equal value’. Of course equal value is a very vague expression which could at the worst be defined at the employer’s own discretion from time to time. Accordingly, to avoid arbitrariness, the wage survey must contain distinct guidelines for how to compare whether or not different work tasks are of equal value. Systematic work evaluation are not scientific and objective; rather they can be defined as structured subjective valuations. The point is that the valuations should be non gender discriminatory. Evaluations shall be carried out according to four parameters: knowledge, skills, responsibility and effort, parameters that are accepted by the parties in the labour market. If any unwarranted wage differential is found, the employer has to take care of the matter

² The clauses of wage surveys were introduced in the Equal Opportunity act in 1994 but was largely ignored by the parties. In 2001 the clauses were tightened up with the demand of analyses and action plans.

as soon as possible and the differences must be definitely abolished within three years.

It is also recommended, though not necessary, that the wage surveys and the action plans should be drawn up in cooperation with the local trade union branches or any other representatives for the employees. The local trade union branches have the right to partake in the wage surveys and the creation of the action plan. Moreover, the employer can be ordered to pay default fines if wage surveys or action plans do not comply with the law. Section 12 in the Equal Opportunity Act also gives trade union representatives, who collaborate in the work of wage surveys and action plans, the right to insight into individual wages of non-unionised employees too. This strengthening of union power is to be seen as an attempt to vitalise the participation of local trade unions in wage survey work at firm level. In our opinion, cooperation is a key to equal wages and working conditions between men and women.

Thus the formation of the new, or at least more regulated, wage policies also form a new arena for discussion between employers and employees. The new regulation sets the frame for a discussion that might lead to a mutual understanding of guidelines for a 'fair' wage setting regarding the single employee. Further, from a trade union perspective, the regulation opens another door: since the employer must openly value work tasks, the overall wage policy of the firm will be visible and perhaps negotiable. If the rules are followed correctly, it will not be possible to withhold the reasons for why some positions or work tasks should be valued more highly than others.

Self Regulation and Self Reconstruction

Fundamental to the new legislation is that issues of wage discrimination should as far as possible be handled through 'self reconstruction'. The concept self reconstruction is new in Swedish labour legislation and more far-reaching than the older notion 'self regulation' that has been in use for long.

Self regulation means that the legislator let the social partners, normally organised employers and trade unions, have a great say on the practical outcome of the implementation of new legislation, through modifications in collective agreements (Fransson and Stüber, 2004). Wages and working conditions are mainly a matter of bargaining and collective agreements within the self regulating system. A self regulating system accepts a fundamental conflict perspective, that is, a conflict between capital and labour, and the strike weapon can be used to obtain new collective agreements. Since 1803 there has been no legislation on wages in Sweden. The collective agreement stand out as the guarantee for minimum wages and as protection from social dumping.

Self reconstruction, on the other hand, aims to make employers as well as trade unionists change their values and routines, and to make decisions regarding wages and employment conditions 'on grounds of fact'. This, in turn, is based on three preconditions: a notion of a mutual understanding between the social partners; the employer's prerogative and responsibility; and the possibility to fine the employer in the Labour Court if violations of the Equal Opportunities Act are not taken care of in due time. The purpose is to start workplace activities and processes that encourage equality between the sexes; thus the legislation also leaves a lot of

room for shop-floor solutions if practical problems are found. The idea of self reconstruction is to a large extent the result of the general shift in the Swedish labour market towards decentralisation and individualisation; the changes in collective bargaining demands new methods for wage formation.

The structural features and differences of a self regulative and self constructive system is summarised in the following tableau:

<i>Self regulation:</i>	<i>Self reconstruction:</i>
Fundamental conflict (capital vs. labour)	Harmony (mutual understanding)
Collective bargaining	Co-operation
Formal contacts	Informal contacts
Collective agreements	Employer's prerogative
Strikes	Notification
Sanctioned by Civil law	Public law
Fines	Under a penalty of fines
'Good behaviour'	'Objective grounds'
Semi-dispositive law	Obligatory law

Self Reconstruction in Practice

Wage policy/criteria must also be transparent for people outside the firm; that is, if the governmental agency – JämO – demands to see the plan of the wage setting criteria, it must be possible to follow the argumentation for why wage differences

exist between male and female workers.³ In 2002, the Swedish Government commissioned JämO to investigate and comment on how Swedish employers lived up to the new demands of self reconstruction on equal wages (JämO, 2004). In June the same year, JämO notified 10,000 companies with ten or more employees and the largest trade union branch in the company to account their wage surveys and action plans on equal pay. Of these 10,000 companies, 531 were selected for a narrow investigation. These 531 companies had to send all data on the wage surveys and their action plans to JämO. Further, JämO's assessment of employers, in compliance with legal demands concerning annual wage surveys, also included a sample of another 70 employers outside the private-owned sector of the economy, among them eleven governmental authorities. We leave them out of this study, but not very surprisingly we can inform that the employers in the public sector has attained the best concrete result from their conducted wage surveys.

When the introduction of the new clauses were first proposed in a preparatory work in 1999 (SOU 1999, no. 91) many employers, both in private-owned companies and in the public sector, feared that the new rules should claim unreasonable demands on 'fair wages' as well as on the mapping of them. The critics feared a governmental intervention in the collective wage bargaining and a move back to the centralised wage system.

Hence it is interesting to see what happened in practice. As researchers, we have been allowed to study the classified material from the survey of the 531 companies at the JämO Office. The material is highly interesting in at least two ways:

³ JämO, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, with nearly 30 employees, works to monitor the compliance of the Equal Opportunity Act and legislation on equal treatment of students of higher education.

first, it shows gender differences in the Swedish labour market today in a way aggregated data can never do; second, it gives a very good view of how Swedish employers look upon what are 'fair' or 'just' wage differences. Also, the material contains information about the role of trade unions in these matters.

It was however very obvious that many employers remained uninformed of the new rules from 2001 and had a lack of interest in gender issues. Moreover, those who know the rules, generally had a rather low level of ambition; they just did what was absolutely necessary according to the new clauses without further analysis or comparisons, and without considering that the plans could be of future use to themselves. Nor was the distinction between 'equal work' and 'work of equal value' very clear. Still, though, the material contains much interesting information, of which we are here only able to present a sample.

The Gendered Labour Market

The most striking impression the material makes is that it so strongly verifies the highly gender differentiated Swedish labour market. In the private sector men are producing while women are administrating; men are managing while women follow directions. Accordingly, since men and women perform such different jobs, comparing totally different work tasks seem beyond the understandable to most employers.

No doubt the strong gender differentiation is a major obstacle for the adaptation of the new rules to working life practice. The foundation of the new legislation is comparisons within the single employer's field of business; thus wage

differences due to structural injustice between companies, regions and sectors can pass unnoticed.

Another obstacle, and a consequence of the strong gender differentiation, is that there are very few workplaces in our sample with an equal share of male and female employees; in most cases, women are a small minority, which means that individual women are often compared to groups of men. In the smaller companies, the differences are usually so striking that comparisons of gender is impossible to follow for someone outside the firm. The following table shows the gender distribution in firms with 50 or more employees, in total 121 companies in our sample:

[Place table 1 about here.]

As we can see, there are less than 30 per cent women in more than half of the firms, but still, in almost 30 per cent of the companies, women constitute more than half of the labour force. In other words, these larger companies can give us a hint of the rules of gender fairness work in practice.

First, we know that if different positions are not taken into account, women are less paid than men, as noted in the introduction to this article. If we look at table 2, we find the overall differences between the sexes, based on individual data, but without any distinction between skills or different positions within the firms.

[Place table 2 about here.]

In 78.5 per cent of the firms, women on average earn less than men. Further, the average difference between the companies, that is, the difference between women's pay and men's pay in the 102 firms, is 94.2 per cent.

Yet, this might not be a discrimination problem, if the different positions men and women hold, or their different skills, can justify the differential. Therefore, let us first look deeper into the remuneration for work tasks/positions that the firms find equal or of equal value. The table below lists only gender differences in works that the companies themselves have claimed are 'the same' or 'comparable', i.e., of the same value. If so, the outcome of our comparison of differences in 'equal' jobs should be a fair share between men and women, but table 3 speaks a bit differently.

[Place table 3 about here.]

It is obvious that the differences between the sexes are smaller than in the previous table, but they are not eliminated. The average, non-weighted gender wage gap was 94.2 per cent according to table 2. Yet, if we measure only the differences that the companies in our sample themselves claim are comparable, we still do not arrive at 'equal pay'. The differences are smaller, no doubt, but they are not eliminated. The average wage gap has narrowed to 97.5 per cent. The difference might seem negligible, but it must be kept in mind that this is a difference based on the employers' own judgements of what is 'fair'; in other words, even if the employers set their own limits, they do not arrive at a totally gender neutral pay setting.

Moreover, women are far less represented than men at top positions in the firms. If we stick to the sample of 121 companies with 50 or more employees, it is very obvious that women are not very well represented among the best paid employees (or rather managers). In table 4, we show the percentage of women in the best paid decile of the studied companies. In some cases, the reporting firms have left out their top positions, but mentioned that the positions are held by men; thus the figures we show are even 'worse than reality' from a gender perspective.

[Place table 4 about here.]

Even though the sample gets rather small, only 88 companies, it is still a representative sample of Swedish firms with 50 or more employees. Hence, it is well worth noticing that no women at all are represented in the highest paid decile in one company out of five. What this means in practice is difficult to say, but would rather be a research project of its own.

What the Employers - After All - Found

Previous academic research on gendered wage differences in Sweden have given rather differing results, especially when it comes to how large the wage gap really is (cf. Fransson et al., 2001, p. 31). To a large extent this depends on the level of aggregation, but no doubt also on political preferences. For instance, researchers close to the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt näringsliv, SN) do not deny that there *exists* an actual wage gap between the sexes, but these researchers are

seldom keen to admit that the gap should be in any way 'unfair'. As hinted, following the official data from *Statistics Sweden*, women at large earned 83 per cent of the average pay for men in Sweden in 2003. The average figure for all EU countries in 2000 was 74 per cent (Fransson et al., 2001, p. 7).

As the last section showed, the wage surveys sent to the JämO give firm-level evidence of the pay differences between the sexes. Yet, the employers almost without exception find justification for the differences. Almost all employers even avoid the use of the expression 'wage discrimination'. In the few cases unjustified wage differences were admitted – in total 4 per cent of the 531 companies – they were normally viewed as a discrimination of a single woman, not a group of women. In comparison, JämO found unwarranted wage differentials at four out of eleven of the larger government agencies checked by JämO (JämO, 2004).

It would be very hard – and a loss of prestige – for employers to admit that the wages they set are discriminating. Yet there are also other explanations why so few unjustified differences are found. As mentioned above, the whole idea of equal pay for work of equal value is unknown to most employers. Hence, they either find all jobs equivalent or none, without further reflections on the meaning of the concept. The expression 'you cannot compare apples and pears' is common in the material.⁴ As a result of these difficulties, less than 20 per cent of the private-owned companies had valued women and men's different work tasks in a satisfactory manner due to

⁴ Even if the Labour Court may be criticised for making too low demands on the employer's evidence in wage discrimination cases, the verdict in AD 2001 no. 13 was a leap forwards from a gender point of view. The Labour Court established that a midwife's job was of equal value compared to a clinical engineer, which was a very useful argument for salary negotiations to come. In another case in 2001, the Labour Court also found an intensive care nurse's work tasks equal to a clinical engineer. The pay differential between the two was not found discriminating though, due to different market positions (AD 2001 no. 76).

the four parameters: knowledge, skills, responsibility and efforts. On the positive side though, the JämO investigation has led to the set up of working committees for the handling of gender related issues in several companies. Even if differences due to sex are still existing, the differences have been put up on the agenda even at the firm level by JämO's major survey of the 531 private companies.

Justification of Wage Discrepancies

The rules of wage surveys and action plans are based on a mutual understanding between the employer and the union, and the evaluation of women's work and the adjusting of unwarranted wages shall preferably be handled by the two parties together. However, it is only when directly or indirectly discriminating wages or working conditions are found that the company must revise its agreements according to the Equal Opportunities Act. In such cases, the individual or collective agreement can also be nullified by the Labour Court.

Moreover, Labour Court practices have influenced the way employers justify existing wage differences between men and women. The most striking example is the reference to 'market value'. In some cases the Labour Court has found it reasonable that different market value, for instance between a midwife and a medical technician, motivate wage differences (AD 2001 no. 13). In the eyes of several employers, the outcome of these cases have been thought of as a 'golden rule' that can be applied to any workplace and any work tasks without exceptions. What the EC court stated in the so-called Enderby case (C-127/92) is usually not familiar to the employers; however, the market can explain wage differentials but it have to be proven!

It is true that the Equal Opportunities Act does not intend that all differences between men and women performing 'equivalent' work tasks are discriminating; the intention of the act was never to guarantee equal pay in general. Certain education, skills and experiences are more attractive in the labour market; therefore the Labour Court has accepted that argument, even though 'attractive' is usually defined in a way that favours education, skills and experience in typically male occupations (Fransson and Thörnqvist, 2004).

In our study of the 531 private-owned companies' wage surveys, we have found only very few open references to market value. One employer claimed demand and supply to be the sole reason for pay differences. Five other employers referred to 'the market' more vaguely. It is not possible to tell why the argument is not more frequent in the material. Likely many employers find the market value argument so obvious that it does not need to be emphasised. Yet, one reason might also be that employers do not believe market value alone to be a sufficient argument for wage differences between single individuals; market value needs qualification by references to 'objective' measurable parameters such as the individual's education, skills and so on.

Accordingly, the most common motivations for wage differences are age, length of service and educational level, but also skills and experiences in the profession. Other common buzzwords are competence and performance. Some employers also refer to the collective agreement, especially agreements with unions affiliated to the LO. This is however rather dubious, since the industry-wide collective agreements do not hold clauses on how to value different work tasks in practice, just on minimum wages, pay raises in per cent etc.

Sometimes, exceptionally, women have higher wages than men, which must also be motivated. The motivations in these cases are generally the same as when men have higher wages: age, length of service, educational level, competence, performance and so on.

Since the sample of 531 companies is representative for Swedish private-owned companies at large, and since most differences can be explained with 'just' measures, the only logical conclusion should be that women are in general younger, have less working experience, poorer education, perform worse etc. than their male colleagues. Some of the parameters are beyond objective control, but it is neither true that women are younger, have shorter length of service, nor lower educational level than men. In other words, it is most likely that the gender equality analysis in general is not always conducted in a proper manner.

The Role of Trade Unions

According to the second clause of the Equal Opportunities Act, the active measures for equal pay shall take place in cooperation with representatives for the trade union or some other representatives for the employees. This is in line with the long tradition of social partnership in the Swedish labour market. Yet, it is not totally binding: the employer cannot be fined for violating the recommendation. If, however, the employer shall be able to live up to the fundamental ideas of self reconstruction, a cooperation with the union counterpart is more or less necessary.

Despite that, our investigation gives indications that less than a fourth of the companies' wage surveys have been made jointly by employers and trade union representatives. Instead the wage surveys has been carried out by, depending on the size of the company, the CEO, the HR/personnel manager or some other representative for top management. In many cases employee representatives have however signed the protocol from the wage survey. In the employers defence, it must be mentioned that many workplaces today do not have any local union representatives (Kjellberg, 2002, pp. 64-6). Moreover, the trade unions do not seem to worry too much about being outside the active measures of equal wages. Rather the unions are taking a wait-and-see approach. In a study of cooperation between employers and trade unions in the private sector its very obvious that gender issues is not a prioritised area by the trade unions (Levinsson, 2004). The unions' future role is thus difficult to foresee today, however unwarranted wages should be a natural issue on the trade unions agenda as well as for the employers.

Conclusion

To conclude, the introduction of the new legislation is a powerful governmental interference in the Swedish labour market, which in the long run might change the Swedish industrial relations system as well as the preconditions for many companies' HRM policies. The pros and cons are not yet much discussed in the public debate, though. The few comments that have been made often focus on the threats the new legislation brings, in particular the hindrances for settling functioning collective

agreements that it imposes – or rather, that employers and trade unionists believe it imposes (Fransson and Stüber, 2004, pp. 147-59).

Why this is so is not especially difficult to see. All involved parties find the purpose with the wage surveys very good: to identify and eliminate unwarranted wages. Yet, neither the involved governmental agencies nor the parties' confederate organisations have been able to spread and clarify what the issue is really about and the practical use of it to the single, small-business employer or the local trade union branches. Many employers in small and medium size firms also find any interference, whatever it is, threatening. Therefore a lot remain as it was before. At firm level, the concerned parties do not see the relevance of formalising the wage setting more than necessary. Instead they rely on the old, silent rule: – if it works, don't fix it. This becomes very obvious in the material we have used for this article. Only some 4 per cent of the firm level investigations show any unwarranted wage differential, while very reliable macro-level statistics speak in a opposite way: women in general are not younger or with poorer education and skills than their male colleagues.

Which are then the potentialities the new legislation might bring that the parties have missed? From an employer point of view, one might always argue that all forms of regulation of shop-floor relations are obstacles to 'managerial rights' and, in bigger companies, the use of HRM policies. Yet, if the single company accepts the wage surveys and methods to compare work of equal value as a part of a new but lasting situation and instead incorporates them with its general wage policy, the surveys might actually be useful. If treated correctly, the surveys can be a means to

clarify 'fair' wage differentials to the employees and thereby avoid dissatisfaction among the workers.

This brings us to the potentialities from an employee perspective. As far as we can see, there are at least three advantages the new wage surveys and analysis might bring to trade unions and employees.

First, companies are more or less forced to make transparent their wage policies at large; it is barely possible to make binding guidelines for how differences between men and women's work tasks should be valued without clarifying the general wage policy in a firm.

Second, according to the Equal Opportunities Act every company must be ready to explain even wage differences between individuals of opposite sex if the trade union has reason to believe them to be unwarrantable. As a consequence, it is not possible for the employer to keep pay raises for 'key employees' dark; if someone is particularly important for the firm and thus deserves higher pay, the employer must still motivate what the importance consists. Unorganised employees are not exempted from this rule: the trade unions have the right to know their pay too, if there are reasons to believe that the Equal Opportunities Act is violated.

Third, in the long run a consequence of the urge on employers to make transparent gendered pay differentials might be a questioning of other wage differences too, for instance between blue- and white-collar workers or employees of the same sex but with different skills. We are of course far from there yet, but it is not an unlikely result of the openness the new legislation brings with it.

Maybe this is what other EU countries might learn from the Swedish experience: that even though existing industrial relations traditions and HRM

policies set strong barriers to the implementation of political decisions in working life reality, the outcome might in the long run be more far reaching than foreseen. It is all a matter of whether the involved parties are able and willing to see the potentialities without hindrances from historically developed patterns. What will come out in the long run is difficult to foresee though. However, since gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the labour market are on the European Union's political agenda, all member states' governments and parliaments must sooner or later deal with the problem; therefore the Swedish development might be worth studying closely in the coming years.

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Tables

Table 1. Number of women in the firms (> 50 employees) Absolute figures and per cent

0-10	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100	In total
19	25	21	13	7	10	10	9	4	3	121
15.7	20.7	17.3	10.7	5.8	8.3	8.3	7.4	3.3	2.5	100.0

Table 2. Women's pay in percentage of men's in companies with 50 or more employees

	<80%	80-85%	85-90%	90-95%	95-100%	100-105%	+105%
# of firms	12	12	6	25	25	13	9
Per cent	11.8	11.8	5.9	24.5	24.5	12.7	8.8

Note: in 19 companies, the absolute differences were not transparent due to different indexation etc. or because only positions with 'comparable gender situations' are shown.

Table 3. Women's pay in percentage of men's in 'equal' jobs, or 'jobs of equal value', according to the employers

	<80%	80-85%	85-90%	90-95%	95-100%	100-105%	+105%
# of firms	0	1	1	14	43	30	5
Per cent	0.0	1.1	1.1	14.9	45.7	31.9	5.3

Note: As in the case of table 2, in 19 companies, the absolute differences were not transparent due to different indexation etc. or because only positions with 'comparable gender situations' are shown. In addition to that, eight companies claimed they had no comparable jobs held by both sexes.

Table 4. Percentage of women employees in the highest paid decile

0.0%	0.1-10.0%	10.1-	20.1-	30.1-	50.1-	+70%
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			20.0%	30.0%	50.0%	70.0%	
# of firms	18	9	29	10	12	6	4
Per cent	20.5	10.2	33.0	11.4	13.6	6.8	4.5

Note: As in the case of table 2, in 19 companies, the absolute differences were not transparent due to different indexation etc. or because only positions with 'comparable gender situations' are shown. In addition to that, in 14 more companies, it was not possible to distinguish the highest decile.